

EUROPEAN SCHOOL OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION

International Military Relations

Key issues handbook for students

Definition of war, by Carl von Clausewitz: “*War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will. (...) war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means*”.

Since the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, States are the **ultimate owners of authority and are responsible for their own security and that of their people**. To do so, they claim the **monopoly over the use of coercive force: internal forces** (such as police or gendarmerie) to respond to internal threats and **military forces** to respond to external threats. These forces are controlled by the State, accountable to it for their actions and they engage the State’s responsibility. There are specific national and international legal instruments defining their mission and limiting their actions as well as judicial procedures ensuring their observance.

Functions of armed forces:

- **External,**
- **Internal:**
 - Coercion and Violence,
 - Aid and relief,
 - Social integration

Historical classification of armed forces, proposed by J. Wiatr:

- **Mass national armies**, composed of majority of state’s male population.
- Armies recruited from only **one class** (usually privileged one).
- **Professional or mercenary** armies.

Contemporary types of military, according to B. Balcerowicz:

- Regular, mass, national armies based on **conscription**,
- **Professional** armies composed of volunteers,

- **Militia** – type armies, based on emergency mobilization of all population in times of danger.

Structural division *inside* armed forces:

- **Operational units** – core part of military forces, which task is to conduct military operations both inside and outside the country.
- **Territorial defense units** – part of military, which task is defending of state's territory. Composed of regular military units, conscripts and – optionally – militias. Those units may get involved in both regular and irregular military actions, depending on actual operational needs.

Apart from “traditional” types of military forces (Ground military forces, Naval military forces, Aerial military forces), several sub – types can be distinguished:

- **Strategic missile forces,**
- Space forces,
- Airborne forces,
- Marines,
- Special forces.

Among non – combat units, sever, several *services* can be distinguished:

- Military Police,
- Medical Corps,
- Military Information.

Military sphere can de divided into three general levels:

- **Tactical,**
- **Operational,**
- **Strategic.**

Military sphere is strongly connected with other areas of life. Lowest, tactical level is strongly influenced by available **technical means** of fighting and connected with sphere of military science and technology. Highest, strategic level is an integral part of state's **policy** and society's **political sphere**.

Civilian control over armed forces.

Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places **ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers**. Civilian control ideal can be described as the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority.

In the Westphalian conception of the state, which defines the present international system of states, **the state does provide for the security of the state and its citizens**. This task is, essentially attributed to the **executive**. The legislative branch of government is capable of exerting some influence on state's security policy, especially on **budget** preparation phase. Since the effective power of parliaments depends also much on parliamentary practice and the parliamentarians' aptitude and attitude, parliamentarians must have **access to adequate information and recourse to competent experts**.

Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy; use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a Western democracy governed by elected officials, though the **subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies**.

Typical chain of command in democratic states:

- The highest position in this chain of command is the **highest constitutionally established civilian authority**, vested with democratic legitimacy. In these states, the commander in chief of the armed forces is the head of the State (the president in the United States and France, the chancellor in Germany or the monarch in the United Kingdom), meaning the armed forces cannot engage in armed conflict without his/her approval.
- The next authority in the chain of command is the **head of the ministry or department of defense** (secretary or minister of defense), who supervises and is responsible for the work of a **defense council** (national security council in the US, defense council in the UK, military command council in Germany). These councils have a very restricted number of members (from 6 up to 20) and deliberate in high secrecy.
- The first non-civilian authority in the chain of command (the highest ranking military officer) is usually part of this council, where he represents the armed forces. This

person (chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in the US, chief of the defense staff in the UK, chief of staff 'chef d'état-major des armées' in France) **is responsible for the implementation of the decisions taken by the defense council by the different service branches of the armed forces** (usually army, navy and air force).

Genesis of contemporary war

XVI -> XIX century: transition from traditional to modern state and warfare. Characteristics of **traditional state** (by A. Giddens):

- **Unclear geographical layout** (no clear borders, fragmentation),
- **weak interrelations** between social groups (nobility, merchants, peasants),
- **sharp division** between city and province,
- **low influence** of central government on province,
- **major type of internal political actions – violence** (requisitions, crime fighting, punitive expeditions),
- most common way of international competition – **war**.

The result of continuous state of war was constant need for resources (mostly money) and was the core reason for any reforms undertaken by European rulers in XVI – XIX century.

Revolution in Military Affairs (by S. Metz, J. Kievit).- *discontinuous increase in military capability and effectiveness" arising from simultaneous and mutually supportive change in technology, systems, operational methods, and military organizations:*




Figure 3. Effectiveness and Revolutions.

Three stages in formation of modern state and war were:

Administrative Revolution:

- Discovery of gunpowder, musket and cannon,
- rise of highly trained, disciplined and expensive professional armies,
- **Internal pacification**, achieved by stripping local elites (nobles) of their **privileges**, enforcing one, centralized **tax system**, **accumulation of authority** in central government,
- Obtaining **the monopoly for using armed violence** by government.

Three stages of change (by W. Murray):

- **Preshock RMAs**: longbow, Edward III's strategy, gunpowder, fortress architecture
- **Military Revolution**: 17th century creation of the modern state
- **Direct- and Aftershocks**: Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms, French tactical and organizational reforms, naval revolution, Britain's financial revolution.

People's (French) Revolution:

- **Change of legitimization** of central government – from birthright (monarchy) to social agreement (republic) and election,
- Replacement of professional armies by **mass** ones,
- Development of **conscription system**.

Three stages of change:

- **Preshock RMAs:** French military reforms (post Seven Years' War),
- **Military Revolutions:** French and industrial revolutions,
- **Direct- and Aftershocks:** national economic and political mobilization, Napoleonic way of war, financial and economic power based on industrialized power, technological revolution of war (railroads, rifles, and steamboats)

Industrial Revolution:

- **Modern productions methods** allow supplying mass armies with abundance of completely new weapons (modern artillery, small arms, machine guns),
- Merging of mass armies with industrial methods,
- **Positional warfare** and **maneuver warfare** as two mains types of military action,
- mounting casualties in each major conflict.

Three stages of change:

- **Preshock RMAs:** Franco – Prussian war, Russo – Japanese war, Boer War,
- **Military Revolution:** World War I,
- **Direct- and Aftershocks:** combined arms, Blitzkrieg, strategic bombing, carrier warfare, unrestricted submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, intelligence, information warfare (1940–45), stealth.

Types of war in past ages (by M. Kaldor):

	<i>17th and 18th centuries</i>	<i>19th century</i>	<i>Early 20th century</i>	<i>Late 20th century</i>
Type of polity	absolutist state	nation-state	coalitions of states; multinational states; empires	blocs
Goals of war	reasons of state; dynastic conflict; consolidation of borders	national conflict	national and ideological conflict	ideological conflict
Type of army	mercenary/ professional	professional/ conscription	mass armies	scientific-military elite/professional armies
Military technique	use of firearms, defensive manoeuvres, sieges	railways and telegraph, rapid mobilization	massive firepower; tanks and aircraft	nuclear weapons
War economy	regularization of taxation and borrowing	expansion of administration and bureaucracy	mobilization economy	military-industrial complex

Key features of **Cold War**:

- **Bipolar** international system,
- Nuclear abundance leading to **sublimation**,
- **Indirect** warfare methods,
- Importance of **local conflicts** and **guerilla warfare**.

Changes in **contemporary military sphere**, outline (S. Metz, J. Kievit):

- There are "**major**" and "**minor**" revolutions in military affairs.
- "**Minor**" revolutions in military affairs tend to be initiated by individual technological or social changes, occur in relatively **short periods** (less than a decade), and have their greatest **direct impact** on the **battlefield**.
- "**Major**" revolutions in military affairs are the result of combined **multiple technological, economic, social, cultural and/or military changes**, usually occur over relatively **long periods** (greater than a decade), and have **direct impact** on **strategy**.
- "**Minor**" revolutions in military affairs can be **deliberately shaped and controlled**; "**Major**" revolutions cannot.
- A "minor" revolution in military affairs driven by military applications of **silicon-chip technology** is underway, and the next "minor" revolution may be driven by **robotics** and **psychotechnology**.
- In the future, "**minor**" revolutions in military affairs **will occur closer together** than in the past, almost to the point of continuous revolution.
- The world is **potentially** at the beginning of a "**major**" revolution in military affairs resulting from the **interaction of multiple economic, social, and cultural changes** driven by silicon-chip, robotic, psycho- and biotechnologies.
- The **increase in combat effectiveness** due to sequential revolutions in military affairs has tended to be **cumulative**, but effectiveness is always a **relative** – not an absolute -- **measurement**.
- Revolutions in military affairs, while increasing some aspects of combat effectiveness, may **either decrease or increase the strategic utility of the military element of power**.




Figure 5. Pattern of Military Revolutions.

Technology is not the only factor shaping contemporary warfare and technological superiority is not the only condition required to win a war. On the contrary, high technology, based on precision, “stand off” strikes may not be an optimal way of fighting against all types of enemy:




Figure 6. Utility of Current Revolution.

According to M. Kaldor, **New Wars** are something different – they have to do not with technology but with the social relations of warfare. The context on New Wars may be described with following points:

- **Disintegration of states** (typically authoritarian states under the impact of globalization), connected with declines in GDP, loss of tax revenue, loss of legitimacy, etc,
- Wars are fought by **networks of state and non-state actors**, often without uniforms, but only with distinctive signs (eg. crosses or Ray-Ban sunglasses as in the case of the Croatian militia in Bosnia Herzegovina),
- **Battles are rare** and where most **violence is directed against civilians** as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics or ethnic cleansing,
- Taxation is falling and **war finance consists of loot and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue,**
- **Distinctions between combatant and non-combatant**, legitimate violence and criminality are all **breaking down,**
- Construction **new sectarian identities** (religious, ethnic or tribal) that undermine the sense of a shared political community.

To some extent, New Wars have much in common with wars in the **pre-modern period in Europe**, and with wars outside Europe through out the period. It is even possible to identify some **elements of New wars in within Old Wars** (for example, the in the effect of the First World War on the Ottoman Empire).

Privatization of Military Sphere

The PMF (Private Military Firms) industry is driven by both military and business fundamentals and breaks down into three broad sectors:

- Military provider firms, also known as “private military companies” or PMCs, which provide **combat and protection services,**
- Military consultant firms which provide **advisory and training services,**
- Military **support** firms, which provide back-up services, such as **logistics, technical support, and transportation.**

The expansion of this industry offers many possibilities, such as cost **savings through competition.** More importantly, it has arisen in a time in which there is **a gap between the supply and demand for professional military forces** in the changed global security environment. There are however, at least three problems connected with usage of PMF:

- **The goals of clients are often at odds with firms’ aims of maximizing profits.** Also, while firms may have market incentives not to abandon their posts or jump ship

for better paying contracts elsewhere, their employees often do not. Operations will thus **depend on soldiers, unaccountable to the code of military justice, who make their own personal risk vs. reward analysis.**

- Privatization also raises problems of employee **selection and accountability**. Military firms recruit effective, but not necessarily congenial workers. Many former members of the most **notorious and ruthless** units of the Soviet and Apartheid regimes have found employment in the industry.
- The third challenge of privatization is its long-term implications. The key to any durable peace is **the restoration of legitimacy**. Unfortunately, if security is privatized, the companies become a **temporary mechanism to preserve peace**, yet do **little to address underlying causes of unrest and violence.**

“THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT”

Basic Principles

- State **sovereignty implies responsibility**, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
- Where a population is suffering **serious harm**, as a result of **internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure**, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities:

- **The responsibility to prevent:** to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.
- **The responsibility to react:** to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
- **The responsibility to rebuild:** to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

Priorities

- **Prevention is the single most important dimension** of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.

- The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always **involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered** before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

The Just Cause Threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and **extraordinary measure**. To be warranted, there must be serious **and irreparable harm** occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

- **large scale loss of life**, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
- **large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’**, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

The Precautionary Principles

- **Right intention:** The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to **halt or avert human suffering**. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.
- **Last resort:** Military intervention can only be justified when **every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis** has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
- **Proportional means:** The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be **the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective**.
- **Reasonable prospects:** There must be a **reasonable chance of success** in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

Right Authority

- There is no better or more appropriate body than the **United Nations Security Council** to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.
- Security Council **authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action** being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should

formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.

- The Security Council should deal **promptly with any request** for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.
- The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree **not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved**, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.
- If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, **alternative options** are:
 - consideration of the matter by the **General Assembly in Emergency Special Session** under the “**Uniting for Peace**” procedure; and
 - action within area of jurisdiction **by regional or sub-regional organizations** under **Chapter VIII** of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.
- The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, **if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect** in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that the **stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer** thereby.

Operational Principles

- **Clear objectives**; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
- **Common military approach** among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
- **Acceptance of limitations**, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
- **Rules of engagement** which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve **total adherence to international humanitarian law**.
- Acceptance **that force protection cannot become the principal objective**.

- Maximum possible **coordination with humanitarian organizations.**

Armed Forces across the World

US Armed Forces structure:

Component	Military	Enlisted	Officer	Female	Civilian
Army	549,153	456,651	88,093	73,902	243,172
Marine Corps	201,031	180,443	20,588	12,290	
Navy	331,768	276,276	51,093	50,008	182,845
Air Force	329,980	261,193	64,370	64,137	154,032
Coast Guard	42,583				
Total Active	1,454,515	1,174,563	224,144	200,337	580,049
Army National Guard	352,600				
Army Reserve	205,000				
Marine Forces Reserve	39,600				
Navy Reserve	66,700				
Air National Guard	106,700				
Air Force Reserve	67,400				
Coast Guard Reserve	10,000				
Total Reserve	848,000				
Other DOD Personnel					97,976

US defense budget structure:

Service	2007 Budget request	Percentage of Total
Army	\$110.3 Bil.	25.1%
Navy/Marine Corps	\$127.1 Bil.	28.8%
Air Force	\$130.2 Bil.	29.5%
Defense Wide	\$73.4 Bil.	16.6%
Total	\$515.4 Bil.	100%

Additional spending: \$23.4 billion for nuclear warheads development and maintenance.

Specific programs spending more than \$1 Bil:

Program	2008 Budget request[4]	Change, 2007 to 2008
Missile Defense	\$8.8 Bil.	-6.2%
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter	\$6.1 Bil.	+23.0%
F-22 Raptor	\$4.6 Bil.	+15.0%
Future Combat System	\$3.7 Bil.	+8.1%
DDG 1000 Destroyer	\$3.5 Bil.	+2.7%
Carrier Replacement Program	\$3.1 Bil.	+117.7%
F/A-18E/F Hornet	\$2.6 Bil.	-13.5%
Virginia class submarine	\$2.7 Bil.	-1.1%
V-22 Osprey	\$2.6 Bil.	+23.9%
MH-60R/S	\$1.6 Bil.	+3.9%

The 2005 U.S. military budget is **almost as much as the rest of the world's defense spending combined** (In 2003, the United States spent about **47%** of the world's total military spending). This is over **eight times larger than the official military budget of China**. The United States and its close allies are responsible for about **two-thirds of the world's military spending**. In 2007, US military spending was **above 1/4 of combined industrial and agricultural production** in the USA.

The United States spends **4.06% of its GDP** on its military (considering only basic Department of Defense budget spending, while **complete military spending is higher by more than 50%** due to additional DoD funding and funding of other federal military departments), more **than France's 2.6%** and less than **Saudi Arabia's 10%**.

U.S. Forces are stationed at more than 820 installations in at least 39 countries. Largest contingents are located in:

- Iraq (142,000),
- Germany (56,200),
- Japan (33,122),
- Afghanistan (31,100),
- South Korea (26,339),
- Italy (9,700),
- United Kingdom (9,700).

US Armed Forces Command structure components are: **CENTCOM** - Central command, which conducts operations in the Middle East, e.g. the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, **EUCOM** controls operations in Europe, and in territory of former Soviet Union, **AFRICOM** is controls operations in Africa, **PACOM** is in charge of operations in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, **SOUTHCOM** is responsible for operations in Latin America, **NORTHCOM** deals with operations in North America, **SOCOM** is in charge of special operations, **JFCOM** provides joint support for worldwide operations, **STRATCOM** controls the strategic weapons and space operations, **TRANSCOM** controls transportation around the world.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal is divided into three levels of stockpile readiness. These are:

- Operationally Deployed: These are active stockpile (fully operational) weapons and mated with delivery systems such that they are ready to be used in combat. All warheads counted under arms limitation agreements belong to this category.

- **Active Stockpile:** Fully operational weapons, available for immediate use, whether or not they are operationally deployed. Reasons for an active stockpile weapon to not be operationally deployed include:
 - Its assigned to a delivery system is not currently operational (in particular ballistic missile submarines spend one-third of their time not on patrol),
 - It is a spare for deployed warheads (should a deployed warhead require maintenance, for example), and
 - It is part of the responsive force -- an inventory of warheads that are kept in operational condition (tritium reservoirs installed, etc.) to permit immediate deployment (for example to upload the number of warheads on a ballistic missile, or reloads for bomber aircraft).
- **Inactive Reserve:** Weapons that are kept intact, but are not maintained in operational condition. This means that limited life components are removed from the weapons and may not be available to immediately return them to service


At the beginning of 2007 the U.S. nuclear arsenal was composed of **eight types** of nuclear warheads (in **thirteen variant mods**) that are operationally deployed, with an estimated count of **5,736** active stockpile warheads. The total number of warheads of all levels of readiness stands at **9,962** warheads.

Comparison of military expenditures across the world:

Rank	Country	Military expenditures (USD)
—	World Total	1,470,000,000,000
—	NATO Total	1,049,875,309,000
1	United States	651,163,000,000
—	European Union Total	312,259,000,000
2	People's Republic of China	70,242,645,000
3	France	61,571,330,000
4	United Kingdom	56,889,000,000
5	Japan	48,860,000,000
6	Germany	45,930,000,000
7	Italy	40,050,000,000
8	Russian Federation	40,000,000,000
9	India	32,700,000,000
10	Saudi Arabia	31,050,000,000
11	Turkey	30,936,000,000
12	South Korea	28,500,000,000
13	Brazil	23,972,836,012

14	Spain	18,974,000,000
15	Iraq	17,900,000,000
16	Canada	16,061,762,400
17	Australia	15,744,500,000
18	Israel	13,300,000,000
19	Netherlands	12,000,000,000
20	Poland	11,791,000,000

Relative distribution chart:



People’s Republic of China Military

Deng Xiaoping: *“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”*

China’s leaders **have not publicly articulated an explicit**, overarching “grand strategy” that outlines national strategic objectives and the means to achieve them, nor are the linkages between the occasional strategic pronouncement and actual policy decisions in China apparent, especially during periods of crisis or instability. Although **such vagueness may reflect a deliberate effort to conceal intentions and capabilities**, as implied in Deng Xiaoping’s “24-character strategy”, **it may reflect genuine uncertainties, disagreements, and debates** among China’s leaders over preferences for long-term goals and objectives. PLA

military writers draw freely from a **range of ancient and modern sources**, including classical strategists from China's imperial past as well as Chinese Communist Party icons. Given the wide range of such writings and the very real possibility that the PLA authors may be writing specifically for foreign consumption, the study of PLA grand strategy remains a fundamentally inexact science. Still, it is possible to make some generalizations about China's strategy based on strategic tradition, historical pattern, official statements and papers, and emphasis on certain military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives.

China's leaders **appear** to have adopted a coherent set of enduring strategic priorities, which include the **perpetuation of China Communist Party rule, sustained economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing China's status as a great power**. Less clear are the specific strategies and plans Beijing has developed to achieve these objectives, the decision-making structures that guide strategy development and execution, and the manner and direction in which these priorities may adjust in response to changes in the security environment.

- The PLA is **undergoing a military leadership secession** of equal importance with China's civilian political transition. A new group of senior military officers has already assumed major responsibilities in military regions, general staff departments, and service branches.
- The PLA is **pursuing a vigorous and multifaceted military modernization program** supported by significant real annual increases in defense spending. It is expanding missile force capable of striking Taiwan, even from longer ranges. It is acquiring new multirole combat aircraft with long-range strike capabilities, improving its command, control, communications, and intelligence, and augmenting naval capabilities for perimeter defense and local amphibious operations.
- There are two major uncertainties in assessing future defense trends: **how long can China sustain the remarkable economic expansion that has supported this defense buildup, and how much will other priorities curtail military modernization requests?**
- The PLA military strategy sees the **United States as its principal adversary**. As a result, the PLA increasingly emphasizes preemptive, asymmetric strikes against

critical American military targets, as well as active and passive defenses against U.S. long-range precision strike systems.

- **Nationalism is a growing force within Chinese society as a whole and the PLA in particular.** Together with continued economic prosperity, nationalism has become a major factor affecting regime legitimacy and the overall basis of state power. Nationalist issues have spurred the PLA to focus more attention on irredentist claims, as well as longstanding geostrategic claims along China's periphery.

Chinese army retains a **critical role in defending the party and the people from internal and external enemies**. However, these missions have also suffered attrition. Given the **improbability of a ground invasion of China**, the ground forces have exercised this function with existing equipment and have received low priority in the struggle for procurement resources. At the same time, **the army role in internal security has been diminished considerably since 1989** with the transfer of a number of PLA units to the People's Armed Police. In addition, the army has not played a prominent role in the internal debate on the revolution in military affairs, thus limiting service influence over the future shape of the PLA. **Majority of the 100 army divisions are likely to remain low- to medium-tech forces that lack weapons with the range and precision to be used in an offensive mode against modern armies.**

If the army is to realize its goal of developing selected forces capable of acting swiftly to deal with contingencies along the country's periphery, it will have to make **further reductions in force structure**, continue its significant communications enhancements, procure a number of modern weapons, increase reserve capabilities, and expand training.

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles.

China has **the most active ballistic missile program in the world**. It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.

Cyberwarfare capabilities.

In the past year, numerous computer networks around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have **originated within the PRC**. These intrusions require many of the skills and capabilities that would also be required for computer network attack. Although it is unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC government,

developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is **consistent with authoritative PLA writings on this subject.**

Naval Power.

China's naval forces include **74 principal combatants, 57 attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and 49 coastal missile patrol craft.**

Air and Air Defense.

China bases **490 combat aircraft** within un-refueled operational range of Taiwan, and has the **airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds.** Many of these aircraft are upgrades of older models; however, newer, and more advanced, aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory.

Ground Forces.

The PLA has about **1.25 million ground forces personnel;** with approximately **400,000 based in the three MRs opposite Taiwan** China is upgrading these units with modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA ground forces are the approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main battle tanks now deployed to units in the Beijing and Shenyang MRs.

The PLA is compiling and validating a new **Outline for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE)** to align its military training with its vision for transformation for warfare under "informatized conditions." The new OMTE will emphasize realistic training conditions, training in electromagnetic and joint operations environments, and integrating new and high technologies into the force structure.

China's militia forces are **shifting from a ground forces-oriented support element to a multiservice force supporting the ground, naval, aviation, and missile forces.** The PLA is also integrating militia forces with active duty units in training for future combat operations. **China's militia forces number 10-15 million;** fully integrating this force will be a challenge.

The People's Armed Police (PAP)

The PAP consists of **approximately 660,000 personnel** organized for **internal defense and police enforcement missions.** Internal defense units are responsible for **border security, fire fighting, and domestic security including counterterrorism.** Police

enforcement units include troops charged with gold, forestry, hydroelectric, and communication security. In recent years, the PAP has also supported **disaster relief operations and infrastructure construction** (e.g., power projects, highways, tunnels, and bridges). During wartime, the PAP is charged with **supporting PLA operations, primarily domestic security, enabling the PLA to focus on combat missions**. The PAP may also be responsible **for protecting logistics and transportation, and military, economic, and political installations**. The PAP has participated in exercises with PLA and other units on a variety of missions including medical support, reconnaissance and air patrol, air defense, and counterterrorism. The PAP has also participated in exchanges with other countries, including Russia, and has been deployed to provide embassy security in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Military Expenditure Trends

On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a **17.8 percent increase in its military budget to approximately \$45 billion**. This number was later revised by the PRC State Council to \$45.99 billion, a 19.47 percent increase from 2006. The announced 2007 military budget continues a trend of official annual budget increases that surpass growth of the overall economy. Analysis of PRC budget data and International Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP data for the period of 1996 to 2006 show **average annual defense budget growth of 11.8 percent** (inflation adjusted) **compared with average annual GDP growth of 9.2 percent** (inflation adjusted).

Key factors shaping China's military future are:

- Economics,
- Demographic Pressures,
- Domestic Political Pressures,
- Corruption,
- Environment,
- Regional Concerns.

Defense Expenditures of the PRC: 1996-2007




Figure 6. Defense Expenditures of the PRC: 1996-2007. The graphic depicts China's official defense budget since 1996, and associated DoD estimates of actual defense expenditures. Announced budgets are from State Council announcements during the annual National People's Congress meeting. DoD estimates include projected expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military research and development, and paramilitary forces. All figures are in 2007 U.S. dollars

2007 Military Budgets of China and Regional Powers




Figure 7. 2007 Military Budgets of China and Regional Powers. This graphic compares China's official and DoD-estimated military expenditures with that of other regional militaries. Military expenditures are derived from authoritative (e.g., government) sources. All figures are in 2007 U.S. dollars.

Military Alliances.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty is a military alliance established by the signing of the **North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949**. The NATO headquarters are in Brussels, Belgium, and the organization constitutes a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party.

For its first few years, NATO was not much more than a political association. However, the Korean War galvanized the member states, and an integrated military structure was built up under the direction of two U.S. supreme commanders. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "**to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down**". Doubts over the strength of the relationship between the European states and the United States ebbed and flowed, along with doubts over the credibility of the **NATO defence against a prospective Soviet invasion** - doubts that led to the development of the independent French nuclear deterrent and the withdrawal of the French from NATO's military structure from 1966.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the organization became drawn into the **Balkans** while building better links with former potential enemies to the east, which culminated with **several former Warsaw Pact states joining the alliance in 1999 and 2004**. **On April 1, 2009, membership was enlarged to 28 with the entrance of Albania and Croatia**. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, NATO has attempted to refocus itself to new challenges and has deployed troops to Afghanistan as well as trainers to Iraq.

The **Berlin Plus agreement** is a comprehensive package of agreements made between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002. With this agreement the EU was given the possibility to use NATO assets in case it wanted to act independently in an international crisis, on the condition that NATO itself did not want to act – the so-called "right of first refusal". Only if NATO refused to act would the EU have the option to act.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

With 56 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) forms the **largest regional security organization in the world**.

The OSCE is a primary instrument for **early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in its area**. It has 19 missions or field operations in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Organization deals with three dimensions of security - **the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimension**. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities. All **56 participating States** enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis.

United Nations

The United Nations is an international organization founded in **1945** after the Second World War by **51 countries** committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights. Due to its unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding Charter, the Organization can take action on a wide range of issues, and provide a forum for its **192 Member States** to express their views, through the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees.

Although best known for **peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance**, there are many other ways the United Nations and its System (specialized agencies, funds and programmes), it works on a broad range of issues, from **sustainable development, environment and refugees protection, disaster relief, counter terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, to promoting democracy, human rights, governance, economic and social development and international health, clearing landmines, expanding food production.**

European Union.

The European Union (EU) is an **economic and political union** of 27 member states, located primarily in Europe. It was established by the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 November 1993, upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. With a population of almost **500 million**, the EU generates an estimated 30% share (US\$18.4 trillion in 2008) of the nominal gross world product.

The EU has developed a single market through a standardised system of laws which apply in all member states, ensuring the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital. It maintains **common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, and regional development**. A common currency, the euro, has been adopted by sixteen member states

constituting the Eurozone. The EU has developed a limited role in foreign policy, having representation at the WTO, G8 summits, and at the UN. It enacts legislation in justice and home affairs, including the abolition of passport controls between many member states which form part of the Schengen Area. **Twenty-one EU countries are members of NATO.**

The EU operates through a hybrid system of **intergovernmentalism and supranationalism**. In certain areas it depends upon agreement between the member states, in others, supranational bodies are able to make decisions without unanimity. Important institutions and bodies of the EU include the **European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank**. The European Parliament is elected every five years by member states' citizens, to whom the citizenship of the European Union is guaranteed.

The EU traces its origins to the **European Coal and Steel Community** formed among six countries in 1951 and **the Treaty of Rome in 1957**. Since then the union has grown in size through the accession of new countries, and new policy areas have been added to the remit of the EU's institutions.

Contemporary international operations:

Region	State / Area	Organization	Name
Africa	Democratic Congo Republic	UN	MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
		European Union	EUPOL RD CONGO
		European Union	EUSEC RD (EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
		European Union	EUPOL KINSHASA (European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa, DRC)
	Liberia	UN	UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia)
	Central Africa Republic / Chad	UN	MINUCRAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)
	Africa's Horn	NATO	OAP (Operation Allied Protector; Anti – pirate operations in Africa's Horn)
	Western Sahara	UN	MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)
	Somalia	NATO	Support for AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia)
		African Union	AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia)
		European Union	Anti – pirate operations EU NAVFOR ATLANTA
	Sudan	UN	UNIMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan)
		African Union	AMIS II (African Union Mission in Sudan)
		UN	UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur)

	Ivory Coast	UN	UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire)
America	Tahiti	UN	MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
Asia	Afghanistan	NATO	ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)
		European Union	EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (EU Police Mission in Afghanistan)
	Armenia	OSCE	Mission in Eryvan
	Azerbaijan	OSCE	Office in Baku
	Georgia	OSCE	Mission in Georgia
		European Union	EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission)
	Georgia / Azerbaijan / Armenia / Mountain Karabach	OSCE	OSCE Mission in Mountain Karabach
	Iraq	NATO	NTM-I (NATO Training Assistance Implementation Mission in Iraq)
	Kazakhstan	OSCE	Center in Astana
	Kyrgyzstan	OSCE	Center in Bishkek
	Tajikistan	OSCE	Center in Dushanbe
	Turkmenistan	OSCE	Center in Ashchabadz
	Uzbekistan	OSCE	OSCE Coordinator
	India / Pakistan	UN	UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)
	Timor	UN	UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste)
Near East	Iraq	European Union	EUJUST LEX (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq)
	Israel / Palestine	European Union	EUPOL COPPS (EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories)
		European Union	EU BAM Rafah (EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories)
	Israel / Syria	UN	UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force)
	Lebanon	UN	UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon)
	Middle East	UN	UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization)
Europe	Albania	OSCE	Mission in Albania
	Belarus	OSCE	Mission in Minsk
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	OSCE	Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
		European Union	EUFOR-Althea (EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
		European Union	EUPM (European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
	Croatia	OSCE	Mission in Zagreb
	Cyprus	UN	UNIFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)

	Montenegro	OSCE	Mission in Montenegro
	Georgia	UN	UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia)
	Kosovo	NATO	KFOR (Kosovo Force)
		OSCE	Mission in Kosovo
		UN	UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)
		European Union	EULEX KOSOVO (European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo)
	Macedonia	OSCE	Conflict prevention mission in Skopje
	Moldova	OSCE	Mission in Moldova
	Serbia	OSCE	Mission in Serbia
	Ukraine	OSCE	OSCE Coordinator
	Ukraine, Moldova	European Union	UE Border Mission
Europe / Africa	Mediterranean	NATO	OAE (Operation Active Endeavor)

International transfers of armaments

Although the volume of deliveries of major conventional weapons dropped in 2007 compared to 2006, the **long-term upward trend in transfers** that began in 2003–2004 continues—transfers over the period 2003–2007 were 7 per cent higher than in 2002–2006. **The five largest suppliers** for the period 2003–2007—the **USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK**—accounted for approximately **80 per cent** of all deliveries.

Among the **major recipients** during this period were regional powers in Asia, such as **India, China and South Korea**; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states **Greece and Turkey**; and US allies in the ‘global war on terrorism’ and beneficiaries of US military aid in Asia and the Middle East.

Table 7.1. The five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons and their main recipients, 2003–2007

Supplier	Share of global arms transfers (%)	No. of recipients	Main recipients (share of supplier's transfers, %)
USA	31	71	South Korea (12), Israel (12), UAE (9), Greece (8)
Russia	25	45	China (45), India (22), Venezuela (5), Algeria (4)
Germany	10	49	Turkey (15), Greece (14), South Africa (12), Australia (9)
France	9	43	UAE (41), Greece (12), Saudi Arabia (9), Singapore (7)
UK	4	38	USA (17), Romania (9), Chile (9), India (8)

UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <<http://armstrade.sipri.org/>>.










Both supplier and recipient states cited a number of political, financial and security related objectives to **justify the transfers** that support the upward trend. For a number of states in Africa, the Middle East and South America, resource revenues fuelled rising military budgets, which in turn financed significant increases in the volume of orders for, and deliveries of, arms:


- **Developing nations** continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers.
- **Major purchases** continue to be made by a **select few developing nations** in these regions, principally China and India in Asia, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.
- **The strength of individual** economies of a wide range of nations in the developing world continues to be a **significant factor** in the timing of many of their **arms purchasing decisions**.
- Increases in the **price of oil**, while an advantage for major oil producing states in funding their arms purchases, has, simultaneously, caused economic difficulties for many oil consuming states, contributing to their decisions to curtail or defer new weapons acquisitions.
- A number of less affluent developing nations have chosen to **upgrade while reducing** new purchases.

Arms sales (agreements) by the Leading Recipient Developing Nations, 1999-2006 (in billions of current U.S. dollars)



Rank	Country	Amount spent	Percent of total
1	India	31.9	13
2	Saudi Arabia	26.4	11
3	China	16.0	7
4	UAE	14.3	6
5	Pakistan	13.7	6
6	Egypt	12.3	5
7	Israel	9.5	4
8	South Korea	8.9	4
9	Syria	6.1	3
10	Venezuela	4.0	2
11	All other developing countries	93.1	39

Arms sales (agreements), by Supplier, 2000-2007 (in billions of constant 2007 U.S. dollars)

Supplier	Total Sales in US Dollars (billions)	Percent of total sales
United States	 134.835	38%
Russia	 67.549	19%
France	 32.096	10%
United Kingdom	 26.425	8%
China	 12.547	4%
Germany	 13.859	4%
Italy	 7.045	2%
Other European	 39.024	11%
Others	 22.523	7%

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, *CRS Report for Congress; [Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007](#)* . October 23, 2008

Notes: Percentages are rounded; Each country shown as follows:

 developing countries
 industrialized countries

Despite attention-grabbing headlines, **it seems unlikely that South America is in the midst of a classically defined arms race.** There is some evidence that the arms acquisition programs of Brazil, Chile and Venezuela have been influenced by the actions of their neighbors and have themselves had an impact on the procurement decisions of other states in the region.

The **international transfer of arms to conflict zones in Afghanistan and Sudan** illustrates a number of tendencies. First, **UN arms embargoes** imposed on armed non-state actors in Afghanistan and Sudan have **thus far failed to stop their arms acquisitions.** Second, **major arms suppliers have been willing to show their support for the Afghan and Sudanese governments by directly supplying them with arms.** In the Afghan case, the **shift from Soviet to US and other Western equipment** is a significant change in US arms supplies to the ANA. **China and Russia continue to support Sudan with arms supplies** and to block a blanket UN arms embargo on Sudan.

Possible additional readings:

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- S. Metz, J. Kievitt, *“Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs, from theory to policy”*, Strategies Studies Institute, 1995
- W. Murray, „Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1997
- P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security*”, International Security - Volume 26, Number 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 186-220
- *“The Responsibility to Protect”*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001
- *“Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”*, Annual Report to Congress, 2008
- S. E. Flanagan, M. E. Marti, *“The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition”*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2003